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Abstract. Real asset investment, which is assumed to be worthier than traditional assets in regards to exposure to in-
come volatility, has become central to investment portfolios in financial institutions. However, the features of illiquidity 
and uniqueness involved in an individual real asset deal require private investors to review the full dimensions associated 
with the transaction structure. Banks and global credit rating agencies assess the quality of products by relying heavily on 
qualitative research executed by human insights and experiences. Such an approach ensures the comprehensiveness of the 
review process but it requires excessive resources in time and money. This study presents an internal rating system that 
instantly screens features of a deal proposal and provides a rating compatible with the global rating standard. The result 
shows that the outcomes created by this model are mostly clustered from BBB to BB. These findings match the average 
ratings for real assets, as determined by global rating agencies, which strengthens the practicality of the proposed model.
Keywords: credit rating, alternative investment, real estate, infrastructure, Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Introduction
Investment positions in illiquid real assets, such as real estate 
and infrastructure, have been growing since the 2008 finan-
cial crisis (Choi, 2018). KPMG (2019) reported that more 
than $3 trillion is annually invested for new infrastructure 
development around the world and predicted that the ex-
penditure will double in meeting the United Nation’s Mil-
lennial Development Goal. World Bank (2018) announced 
that in the half of 2018, private capital of $43.5 billion was 
invested in infrastructure greenfield projects. In terms of 
real estate, global transaction volume was $250 billion in the 
third quarter of 2018, up 3.6% from the beginning of the 
year and 1.2% year-on-year (Barkham & Luo, 2018).
Pension funds have facilitated capital construction 
projects by providing loans and equity while expecting to 
take stable cash flows in operation and a capital gain at 
the end. The study conducted by Heitmann and Davison 
(2018), where the degree of risk of unrated project finance 
loans is comparable to that of BBB grade corporate bonds 
when the project is at the stabilized time (usually the first 
three years) and comparable to that of A grade bonds after 
stabilization, bolsters interest in real assets. It argues that 
a high recovery rate of more than 80%, even during eco-
nomic turmoil, attracts investors᾽ appetites. CBRE (2017), 
a global real estate consulting firm, reveals the empirical 
result that the yield trend of BBB shows a similar pattern 
in the capitalization rate of commercial real estate. M&G 
Institutional (2017) strengthens CBRE’s argument by pre-
senting a study that observes the stability of spread gap 
between these two products in the United Kingdom.
The inevitable feature of information asymmetry prin-
cipally caused by an asset᾽s heterogeneity negatively affects 
trading and liquidity (Peng & Brucato, 2004; Raz, Shenhar, 
& Dvir, 2002). Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003) suggested 
alternatives to alleviate uniqueness: interest for proper-
ties with stable cash flows and avoidance for professional 
brokers. However, these suggestions are not practically ap-
plicable to mega-projects that require high capital to buy 
neighboring properties and are managed by a single broker.
Most financial institutions adopt a procedural deci-
sion process to tackle issues mostly caused by informa-
tion asymmetry: proposal review, risk department en-
gagement, approval by the committee (Morgan Stanley, 
2014). First, dealers review all dimensions of a proposed 
deal according to the regulatory guidelines and corporate 
investment policy. Second, the risk department assesses 
risks in-depth. During this process, the dealer and the in-
house risk assessor work together for due diligence. Lastly, 
the investment committee reviews the proposal and makes 
a final decision. This systemic approach helps clearly 
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location, property, and cash flow, are the same regardless of 
asset class but sub assessment criteria vary. The total score 
is calculated by multiplication between the assigned score 
of each criterion and its weight.
In spite of its systemic guideline, tendency of financial 
institutions that tended to rely on both the LTV and the 
premature internal rating system as well as overlooked the 
lack of liquidity in the real estate market led to risk control 
failure in the 2008 financial turmoil. Specifically, the inter-
nal model is perceived as unqualified for credit assessment 
due to the variability of rating outcomes (BIS, 2017). It is 
expected that the forthcoming Basel IV will reinforce the 
policy of LTV and internal model development (McKin-
sey & Company, 2017).
Developing an internal rating model specifically for real 
assets is unavoidable. The matter is how much an internal 
model functions for the perspective of accuracy and con-
venience enhancement. This study develops a model that 
achieves these two premises. This platform is not newly 
created but is created in a simplified course of currently 
available rating methodologies. As such, this study extracts 
key risk criteria by reviewing previous studies and suggests 
ideas for a systemic approach. Then, the validity of the new 
model is confirmed by an analysis of case studies, reflect-
ing the needs of investment banks seeking a fast decision. 
This rating mechanism, which can funnel large amount of 
investment proposals to small candidates, reduces the con-
sumption of resources for filtering, and finally, expedite the 
speed of the investment committee judgement.
1. Applications and limitations of previous studies
Both global rating agencies and academic researchers have 
studied the subject of internal ratings (Allison & Tufts, 2015; 
Bae & Damnjanovic, 2018; Korean Ministry of Land Infra-
structure and Transport, 2016; Medina & Marty, 2018; Mor-
gan Stanley, 2014; Nikolića, Jednak, Benković, & Poznanić, 
2011; Piney, 2003; Renigier-Biłozor, Wisniewski, Kaklaus-
kas, & Biłozor, 2014; Ribeiro & Ferreira, 2017; Standard 
& Poor᾽s, 2014). Taking into consideration relevance to 
this study and concreteness of information, six previous 
studies are selected: Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS, 2001); Moody’s (Medina & Marty, 2018); Standard & 
Poor᾽s (2014); Renigier-Biłozor et al. (2014); Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Nikolića et al., 2011); and the 
Korean infrastructure guidelines (Korean Ministry of Land 
Infrastructure and Transport, 2016) (see Table 1).
identify the outlook of a deal but requires excessive use of 
human capital and can lead to a bias in decision making.
Credit rating assessment is a plausible option but only 
selectively applicable. Credit ratings support the financial 
market in three ways: asset transparency, risk premium 
calculation, and simplicity of understanding. First, an as-
set rated by a global rating agency can attract financial 
institutions more easily than a nonrated asset, because the 
3rd party examines the asset’s performance and presents 
the result after in-depth analysis (Tang, 2009). Second, the 
financial industry determines the risk premium of the as-
set by using a credit rating because market participants 
agree the rating itself is a trusted source and an absolute 
proxy for default probability (Hull, Predescu, & White, 
2005; Longstaff, Mithal, & Eric, 2005). Third, the sim-
plicity of the rating system arranged in alphabetical or-
der helps public investors intuitively grasp the risk profile 
(He, Wang, & Wei, 2011). However, only 38% of the infra-
structure and real estate deals from 1983 to 2014 related 
to project finance have been rated (Heitmann, Hawken, 
& Davison, 2017; Meers & Humphrey, 2017). Two attrib-
utes explain this: cost and time spent in the rating service 
and the possibility of having a lower grade than expected. 
In addition, the quality of the rating itself can be an is-
sue (Bae & Damnjanovic, 2018). Bonsall, Koharki, and 
Neamitu (2015) argued that an external environment not 
aligned with the asset itself, such as economic incentives, 
can damage reliability.
Such complexity in risk assessment has triggered devel-
opment of a new risk assessment platform but the invention 
has faced challenges. Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS, 2017), after observing that a predeveloped framework 
that determines the quality of an asset by screening lend-
ing attributes both loan to value and internal rating is not 
fully fit to the BIS’s regulatory standard of risk judgement, 
claimed that the current system should be reengineered. 
The internal rating referred here is the outcome derived 
by a financial institution’s own rating system. In specific, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Real Es-
tate Market Advisory Group (UNECE REM, 2012) recom-
mended applying a predeveloped rating model proposed by 
The European Group of Valuer᾽s Associations (TEGoVA, 
2003). TEGoVA invented a property rating method compat-
ible with the requirement of Basel II. It, in order to ensure 
precise review and judgment of a target asset, developed a 
standalone methodology adaptable for each property cat-
egory. Principle questionnaire categories, such as market, 
Table 1. Critical variables
Category BIS Moody’s S&P Renigier-Biłozor et al. FMEA
Korean 
guideline
Revenue Capacity √ √ √ √ √
Internal Capacity √ √ √ √ √
Financial Leverage √ √ √ √ √
Country Risk √ √ √ √
Location √ √
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BIS (2001) does not obligate installation of an inter-
nal model for specialized loans (a type of project finance 
loan for a real asset’s greenfield project), but it strongly 
recommends institutions develop their own systems and 
provides an implementation guideline. It proposed an 
internal rating model that contains six criteria: financial 
strength/flexibility, collateral control, strength of man-
agement, other risk mitigation, project track record, and 
project phase. BIS expects this approach to contribute to 
the precise estimation of required capital exposure against 
project finance lending, in considering the environment 
that unidentified risk factors can significantly impact a 
bank’s survivability. Similar to the BIS approach, Bank of 
England (2019) developed an internal ratings approach 
particularly for a residential mortgage. Its model results 
in an outcome by assessing the quality of seven attrib-
utes: financial strength, political and legal environment, 
transaction characteristics, construction risk, supply risk, 
sponsor᾽s strength, and security package.
Second, a high standard employing a state-of-the-
art rating system strengthens the reliability of outcomes 
driven by Moody’s (Medina & Marty, 2018) and Standard 
& Poor᾽s (2014). These agencies’ transparent sharing of 
helicopter views of their rating methodologies with the 
public helps promote the credibility of a rating outcome. 
Specifically, for project finance loans, an array of rating 
models in regards to asset type developed from a stan-
dalone methodology helps closely and comprehensively 
assess investment risks inherited from the heterogeneous 
nature of an individual real asset (Medina, 2018; Stand-
ard & Poor᾽s, 2014). However, the heavy involvement of 
qualitative analyses in all aspects except leverage and cov-
erage criteria is a matter (Griffin & Tang, 2012). A lack of 
uniformity in ratings due to raters’ different conceptions 
of a project can cause quality problems (Fracassi, Petry, 
& Tate, 2013). In addition, a heavy expense in time and 
money caused by complexity in ratings impedes periodic 
updates. As such, an outdated rating potentially puts the 
investor’s position in danger (Bae & Damnjanovic, 2018; 
Morgenson, 2009).
Third, Renigier-Biłozor et  al. (2014), who developed 
a hypothetical assessment model for capturing economic 
motivation between sellers and buyers, attempted to as-
sess the regional market risks of residential investments 
in Poland. Unlike the rating models of Moody’s and S&P, 
this framework quantitatively operates while limiting its 
source to publicly accessible data. The lack of data avail-
ability weakens the practicality of this study.
Fourth, FMEA illustrates critical risks by utilizing a 
Risk Priority Number (RPN) that is the result of multiply-
ing three factors: occurrence rating (Failure Frequency), 
detection rating (Failure detection likelihood), and secu-
rity rating (Failure impact) (Moultrie, 2019). Segismundo 
and Miguel (2008) briefly summarized its history. In late 
1940, the US Department of Defense applied FMEA in 
the field of gauging readiness and operation. Success on 
the part of the military encouraged NASA to use it for 
the Apollo program, and the automobile manufacturer 
Ford also adopted the tool in 1970. Currently, it is one 
of the core quality control tools in the industry. Nikolića 
et al. (2011) applied FMEA to examine the financial risks 
of investing in the Serbian energy market. They defined 
risk categories according to a rule proposed by Yescombe 
(2002): commercial, financial, and political risks; and cal-
culated risk on each criterion.
Last, the Korean government (Korean Ministry of 
Land Infrastructure and Transport, 2016) published a 
guide to overseas infrastructure development. The risk 
criteria included in the assessment matrix consist of four 
parts: sovereign risk, developer profile, business idea, and 
public contribution. The result of each part is produced 
by combining qualitative (20%) and quantitative (80%) 
subpart scores.
All studies except Renigier-Biłozor et al. (2014) suffer 
from the same problem of heavy resource consumption in 
qualitative research for assessment. However, considering 
the complexity of a real asset transaction, a numerically 




The rating scale (see Table 2) applied in this study is based 
on the global rating standard from AAA to C, but for sim-
plicity, sub-rating indicators in grades such as positive, 
neutral, and negative are not included. AAA is the highest 
grade in the array, implying an extremely strong financial 
capacity to meet commitments. C is the lowest, implying 
high vulnerability to non-payment and low recovery rate 
at default. The financial industry categorizes grades from 
AAA to BBB as investment and those from BB to C as 
speculation.
2.2. Rating process
The rating model presented in this study is developed 
by referring to the Moody’s project finance methodol-
ogy (Moody’s (Medina & Marty, 2018)). The adoption 
strengthens the reliability of the new model in three ways. 
First, the fact that Moody’s outcomes are globally recog-
nized in the financial market validates the trustworthi-
ness of its system. Bonsall, Koharki, and Neamtiu (2017) 
empirically found that a rating result vary in regards to 
applied rating methodology, depth of information asym-
metry, and risk level of borrower credit status. Such find-
ing reinforces the importance of appropriate application 
of rating architecture and strengthens the reliability of the 
credit rating agency’s assessment platform. The develop-
ment based from such a practical method strengthens the 
potential of the new model in terms of quality. Second, 
Moody’s framework is simpler than S&P’s from the per-
spective of rating procedure and judgment criteria, which 
corresponds to the aim of this study to remove excessive 
assessor subjectivity. Lastly, Moody’s shares the rating 
process and the weight of each evaluation criterion with 
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the public. The comprehensiveness of the BIS and S&P 
methodologies are comparable to the Moody’s but, unlike 
Moody’s, they do not share such information. The infor-
mation shared by Moody’s provides guidelines that mini-
mize the chances of an error in the development.
In particular, this study replicates two rating proce-
dures, such as project rating and rating adjustment, from 
the Moody’s framework but designs its own assessment 
attributes. For project rating, the Moody’s assessment 
consists of business profile (50%), operating risk (20%), 
and leverage and coverage (30%) (see Figure 1). Then, 
the rating is adjusted in consideration of liquidity, struc-
tural features, and etc. However, such complexity requires 
extensive resources in time and money. This study that 
aims for instant rating delivery substitutes each Moody’s 
assessment element to an attribute that captures core 
characteristics of the element. For example, business pro-
file in Moody’s is substituted to demand, operating risk 
to operator and constructor, and leverage and coverage 
to loan to value, in the same weight, respectively. Figure 
1 describes the connection between the Moody’s frame-
work, conceptual project cash flow, and this study’s rat-
ing criteria. The left table illustrates major components of 
the Moody’s system and their weights. The middle figure 
shows a general structure of cash flows of a project. The 
right figure identifies three components of the project rat-
ing architecture of a new system. The rating adjustment 
in the new model contains only two modifiers, such as 
Table 2. Rating definition
Grade Definition Score Quality of investment
AAA Extremely strong financial capacity to meet its obligations 1 Investment 
gradeAA Very strong financial capacity and slightly differ from the credit quality of AAA equivalent 3
A Susceptible to adverse economic conditions but strong financial capacity 5
BBB Adequate protection equipped against adverse economic condition but in some degree exposed 
to a risk
7
BB Facing major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse conditions 9 Speculative 
gradeB More vulnerable to default than BB but obligor has the financial capacity to meet its commitments 11
CCC Vulnerable to nonpayment and the financial capacity to payment solely depends on favorable 
business conditions
13
CC This grade is given when a default is expected to impend in the near future 15
C Highly vulnerable to nonpayment. Low recovery expected at default 17
Note: Definition: S&P Global Ratings (2018). Score: Moody’s (Medina and Marty, 2018).
Figure 1. Moody’s rating architecture
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location and sovereign rating, which is unlike Moody’s ap-
proach that requires professional judgement in liquidity, 
structural protection, and etc. The backbone of the new 
rating model is presented in Figure 2. The rating process 
of each criterion is described in the following chapters.
2.2.1. Demand
The link between the business profile on the left and the 
revenue on the right implies that the Moody’s feature is fit 
to the assessment of revenue capacity (see Figure 1). Here, 
this study decides to only cover the demand potential un-
der the assumption of uncertainty in price control in the 
market. Illiquidity in the real asset market causes an un-
standardized valuation regarding to characteristics of each 
property. Previous transaction record provides a proxy of 
the dollar per square meter unit price but does not ensure 
accuracy in pricing the target’s asset value.
In particular, the rating process of the demand side 
(see Figure 3) is intuitively developed by summarizing the 
Moody’s business profile rating criterion. It is rated by the 
combination between asset status and quality of offtake 
contract. Asset status is separated into brownfield and 
greenfield. A brownfield means an asset has already been 
constructed and fully being operated and generating a sta-
ble income; its main advantage is to reduce uncertainty 
involved in the planning and construction phases. On the 
other hand, a greenfield means a new construction pro-
ject, requiring a huge capital investment for construction 
and possessing no historical performance records; this 
leads to an upshift in the investor’s required return rate.
In the case of a brownfield project, the first task is to 
examine validity of an offtake contract. Here, the valid-
ity is ensured if two conditions are met such that the 
offtake contract is continuously effective and the remain-
ing contract length is at least twice more than the asset 
holding period. A project with sufficient time remaining 
on an offtake contract to ensure economic benefits if the 
project delivers output as stipulated in the contract leads 
to less uncertainty for investors than a project with an 
impending offtake contract termination, all else being 
equal. This means that investment exit will presumably 
be safe if the period of the offtake contract is sufficient. 
The degree of sufficiency is linked to comfort at invest-
ment exit. A situation where the next buyer secures the 
same conditions on the offtake contract that the seller 
had been located cannot undercut the project value in 
terms of revenue capacity. The grade of a project, which 
meets all requirements above, is assumed of the offtaker’s 
credit rating of being granted by a global rating agency. 
The development of such approach is influenced from 
the Moody’s rating process of “predictability of net cash 
flow”, which measures the certainty of product sales by 
reviewing the qualities of payment guarantee and credit 
quality of the payer if an offtake contract is established. 
Moody’s rating ranges from AAA (monopoly and sole 
provider of essential services) to CC (perfect competi-
tion and weak market power).
In the case of invalid offtake contract, the asset’s de-
mand can be indirectly inferred by reviewing the market 
capacity. Measuring the capacity requires reliable sources, 
which can clearly articulate economic condition around 
the neighbouring area, such as transaction record, gov-
ernment statistics, and world-renowned firm (example: 
CBRE, JLL, and Savills)’s consulting reports. This ap-
proach sets to the rating’s cap as of BBB in considering 
unambiguity in such process. The market assumes that the 
risk and return profile of real assets is comparable to BBB 
grade’s corporate bond, which is the lowest grade in the 
investment rating group. If reliable sources are unavail-
able, a C grade is assigned.
Likewise, in the case of a greenfield project, the validity 
of an offtake contract is considered at most. If valid, the rat-
ing of an offtaker is assumed as of the demand quality of an 
asset. Otherwise, the market capacity is used as the source. 
It involves the highest risk in revenue capacity projection, 
leading to the adoption of the most conservative approach. 
In such, the rating’s cap is set to BB, which is one grade low-
er than the brownfield’s max. Under the cap, the rating is as-
signed by selecting the lowest between the developer credit 
rating, the constructor credit rating, and the grade derived 
by market analysis mentioned above. Developer and con-
structor ratings are included because renowned parties that 
tend to minimize their reputation risks are highly likely to 
join projects they expect to be completed successfully. In 
addition, the BB cap, the highest grade in the speculative 
rating group, is introduced because those three conditions 
cannot directly mitigate the demand risk. If this method is 






Operator and  
constructor rating  
(20%) 
Project rating Rating adjustment Final rating 
Sovereign rating Location 
Figure 2. Rating process
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2.2.2. Constructor and operator
Moody’s assesses operator and constructor sides in pro-
fessionally analysing four sub-factors: technology, capital 
reinvestment, operating track record, and operator and 
sponsor experience (see Figure 2). Of these, the first and 
second variables are critical, as they require more quali-
tative analysis than the others. Technology means com-
plexity in construction and operation. Assets involving 
commercially proven and widely used technology, such 
as schools and apartments, are positioned as low risk, but 
assets involving highly advanced technology, such as nu-
clear power plants and chemical plants, are positioned as 
high risk. Moody’s assigns AAA to commercially proven 
technology and CC to commercially unproven technology. 
The requirement for capital reinvestment is typically pro-
portionate to the complexity of the technology involved. 
Here, AAA means there is no capital reinvestment expo-
sure, and CC means capital reinvestment is required in 
amounts exceeding the project’s value. FMEA and the Ko-
rean guidelines includes a similar array of risks.
The new rating also assesses these two parts, but for 
simplification, rates them by referencing to both parties’ 
credit ratings confirmed by a global rating agency. This sim-
plification is based on the fact that the strength of business 
partners is a critical key to achieving project goals. A will-
ingness to maintain the reputation of a renowned building 
contractor motivates a firm to selectively bid on projects and 
to complete construction with full effort. This is also true of 
renowned enterprises that operate a complex asset. Table 3 
illustrates the rating approach in regards to construction 
and operation phases. The construction phase means the 
period before the asset is fully operational and generates 
income as expected. The operation phase stretches from the 
termination of the construction phase to the asset’s lifetime. 
As discussed, the construction company’s credit profile, as 
rated by the global agency, represents the status of internal 
capacity in the construction phase. In the operation phase, 
Figure 3. Demand assessment
Table 3. Constructor and operator rating scale












AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C
If rating 
unavailable
− − − No critical 
event 
record
− − − − Critical 
event 
record
Note:  A rating judged by a Korean rating agency is downshifted by one grade.
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the operator’s rating is used, if available. Otherwise, BBB, 
the lowest grade in the investment group, is assigned if any 
accidents have been recorded since the start of the opera-
tion phase. In the case of a fatal event recorded since the 
start, then, the grade of C is assigned.
2.2.3. LTV
Net profit is determined after operating income is adjusted 
to account for financial expenses. A high debt ratio results 
in a loss in net profit and damages security on the debt, 
making this factor critical. Two of the BIS’s categories, fi-
nancial strength and collateral control, separately describe 
this feature, but they can be consolidated into one measure-
ment of LTV (loan to value). Although the debt service pay-
ment is calculated by multiplying loan size and interest rate, 
the LTV only reflects the half. However, LTV is adaptable 
when there is limited usable information. Direct measure-
ment of DSCR (Debt Service Coverage Ratio) requires a 
high level of accuracy about cash flow. In terms of collateral 
control, LTV is a useful indicator of how the level of tranche 
principally determines the security of a holding.
Moody’s and S&P both quantitatively judge the quality 
of financial status by using DSCR derived from the future 
cash-flow projection. These companies developed multiple 
sets of DSCR scales to use according to the characteristics 
of the target project. FMEA and the Korean guidelines do 
not directly review DSCR but do indirectly consider it be-
cause they contain analysis of net cash flow.
Instead, this study uses LTV as a representative indica-
tor of financial leverage (Table 4). The typical source re-
ferred to is an acquisition plan, called Information Memo-
randum (IM), illustrating debt characteristics of volume, 
interest rate, and amortization plan. Basel III also defines 
that “loan to value” is a core risk factor in applying a 
standardized approach that assesses the credit risk of a 
residential mortgage (BIS, 2017). In particular, it assigns a 
risk weight according to the combination between the de-
pendence of property cash flow and level of loan to value. 
Unlike global rating agencies, this study does not include 
sensitivity analysis encompassing a wide array of stressful 
scenarios because resolving complexity relies on the rater’s 
subjective considerations.
2.2.4. Country risk and location (adjustment)
Table 5 presents the rating adjustment. In terms of country 
risk, BIS describes political upheaval, macroeconomic in-
stability, and legal changes as sources of risk to the country 
that may critically downsize an asset’s performance. S&P, 
FMEA, and the Korean guidelines include sovereign risks in 
their assessment frameworks. In particular, S&P has a mod-
ification process that allows upshifting of the predefined 
project rating by one notch, to as high as the local currency 
rating of the country, if the services and products delivered 
by the project are essential links to the economy and are not 
replaced by other assets in a short time. If not critically po-
sitioned, the adjustment can be triggered by reviewing the 
conditions of economic benefits. It bars the project rating 
up to the sovereign foreign currency credit rating, except 
in a few cases where projects surpass stress tests associated 
with currency transfer. This approach, however, limitedly 
reflects the tendency of a market player’s risk appetite. The 
first consideration for foreign investment is to investigate a 
country’s economic and political surroundings, as sovereign 
risks are uncontrollable in the market. The FMEA includes 
a nation’s political risks, caused by policy instability and 
corruption. The Korean guidelines quantitatively assesses 
the risk, using the public data of GDP growth rate and in-
ternational rank of political corruption.
Location is another key variable. BIS, in the “Supervi-
sory Categories for Income-Producing Real estate,” states 
that geographical location affects an asset’s quality across a 
wide array of features: market conditions and future pros-
pects; strength of management and property quality; and 
collateral control. In practice, S&P explicitly states that it 
heavily judges the market position of the asset. Moody’s, 
FMEA, and the Korean guidelines do not explicitly cat-
egorize this variable on their main assessment frameworks 
but do include its influence in their revenue analysis.
3. Data analysis
3.1. Data description
This study tests the practicality of the proposed rating 
model using the investment deals managed from 2016 to 
2018 by an investment bank in South Korea. The limited 
Table 4. LTV
Scale AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C
LTV − − − Less than 20% 21~60% 61~70% 71~80% 81~90% 91~100%
Note: In the case of equity funding, C grade assigned.
Table 5. Rating adjustment
Country
The country rating AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C
Adjustment 0 0 0 0 −1 −2 −3 −4 −5
Location
Asset’s location Urban area Rural area
Adjustment +1 0
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On the other hand, infrastructure deals having the 
lowest profit rate is acceptable, given that they are fully 
operational and have historical cash-flow records. Several 
overseas transactions were executed but domestic deals 
were not. This is due to weakened domestic supply and de-
mand. On the supply side, the Korean government has in-
creased its welfare budget in 2017 while cutting its Social 
Overhead Capital (SOC) expenditure. The decline delayed 
the implementation schedule for public infrastructure. 
On the demand side, the government’s enforcement of 
controls on regulated return in favour of concessionaires 
negatively impacts the investment sentiment of financial 
institutions. Specifically, since abolishment of MRG, the 
popularity of the Korean PPP market has cooled down.
3.2. Data analysis
Table 7 consists of two sections: deal description and rat-
ing. The primary source of input is the Information Mem-
orandum (IM), a proposal for deal transactions usually 
delivered by the seller to potential buyers. All information 
can be directly secured from the IM. The output is the 
result converted from the input.
In order to illustrate the rating process in detail, Cases 
#13, #32, and #33 are presented in detail. Case #13 is a 
project to provide a mezzanine loan to a property owner of 
a hotel in the central business district of London, UK. The 
tenant is a world-class hotel chain, and the time remain-
ing on the leasing term is over twice the loaning period. 
As this is a typical offtake contract, the credit risk of the 
tenant is a key determinant. The credit rating of the ten-
ant is BBB, as measured by an international rating agency, 
and is presumed to be a grade of offtaker. The grade is the 
same assigned to Operation. The LTV of 62.5% where this 
mezzanine loan is located results in a B grade according to 
the table. The rating of each category is merged according 
to the weight standard, and BB is assigned as an interim 
project rating. In the rating adjustment step, the interim 
rating is upshifted one notch because the asset is located 
inside an urban area. The sovereign rating between Korea 
data availability containing 37 transaction records in the 
three years cannot assure 100% the quality of the pro-
posed work but can help building guidance for implemen-
tation: among 37 transactions, 4 transactions are executed 
in 2016, 8 transactions in 2017, and 25 transactions in 
2018 (Table 7). Two factors mainly cause such data short-
age. The first is a big scale with weak turnover rate. An 
underwriting size for a real asset in average is $50M, and 
the period of resale of such position to an end-investor 
in average is 6 months. Second, it is a new trend that in-
vestment banks brokerage real asset deals. This trend just 
started a few of years ago, and the investment bank tar-
geted by this study joined the new area in 2016.
The data consist of five categories: Hotel, Industrial, 
Infrastructure, Office, and Residential. Each category is 
further subdivided into domestic and overseas (Table 6). 
In terms of profit rate, residential-domestic ranks highest 
(9.0%), while the lowest is infrastructure (5.4%). Residen-
tial-domestic projects having the highest profit rate can 
be explained by two factors: liquidity and greenfield. The 
residential-domestic category is exposed to a high market 
demand uncertainty, something principally attributed to 
an increase in risk and required return. In addition, the 
fact that these projects are in the construction phase and 
have high uncertainty in terms of building implementa-
tion and revenue generation incurs a risk premium. In 
spite of the high risk, 12 of 37 transactions (32.4%) are 
also concentrated in this category. It means that devel-
opers believe that Korea’s high population density and 
continuous economic development make the residential 
sector one of the most lucrative areas in terms of risk and 
return profile. In contrast, overseas residential projects 
have not been executed. The first reason for this is that 
most residential deals tend to be locally transacted due to 
their income stability and relatively better risk resilience 
against the economic cycle. Second, the heavy locality of 
the residential market causes information asymmetry. Di-
verse local variables, such as traffic, school district, crime 
rate, and other social variables that local residents accu-
rately define, affect house price.
Table 6. Investment deals
Category Count
Profit rate (%) LTV (%)
Min Avg. Max Min Avg. Max
Hotel Domestic 1 5.5 5.5 5.5 67 67 67
Overseas 2 6.0 6.0 6.0 63 65 68
Industrial Domestic 5 7.5 8.7 9.7 50 58 67
Overseas 1 8.0 8.0 8.0 100 100 100
Infra Domestic 4 5.0 5.4 6.0 76 90 100
Overseas 9 5.8 8.6 12.5 16 57 100
Office Domestic 2 7.8 7.9 8.0 100 100 100
Overseas 12 4.1 9.0 11.8 27 58 100
Residential Domestic 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 48 48 48
Overseas 1 5.5 5.5 5.5 67 67 67




















1 2016 Off 20 Dom Urban Lend 5.8 91.3 − BBB C BBB BB BBB
2 2016 Off 190 Dom Urban Lend 9.1 69.4 − B B A BB BBB
3 2016 Res 90 Dom Urban Lend 8.3 29 − BBB BB BBB BBB A
4 2016 Res 70 Dom Urban Equity 8.2 100 − BBB C BBB BB BBB
5 2017 Ind 50 Dom Rural Lend 9.5 50 − BB BB A BB BB
6 2017 Off 23 Over Urban Equity 7.8 100 AA − C A BBB A
7 2017 Off 80 Dom Urban Lend 8.0 42.2 − CCC BB BBB B BB
8 2017 Off 60 Dom Urban Lend 7.3 59.0 − BBB BB BBB BBB A
9 2017 Off 20 Dom Urban Lend 7 18.1 − CCC BBB BB B BB
10 2017 Off 36 Dom Urban Lend 12.5 15.8 − BB BBB BBB BBB A
11 2017 Ind 20 Dom Rural Lend 7.5 59.4 − B BB BBB BB BB
12 2017 Res 30 Dom Urban Equity 11.8 70.6 − BB CCC BBB BB BBB
13 2018 Hot 45 Over Urban Lend 6.0 62.5 BBB − B BBB BB BBB
14 2018 Res 41 Dom Rural Lend 6.6 59.8 − BB BB BBB BB BB
15 2018 Ind 10 Dom Rural Lend 9.7 61.8 − BB B BB BB BB
16 2018 Res 30 Dom Rural Lend 8.0 39.3 − BBB BB BBB BBB BBB
17 2018 Inf 200 Over Rural Lend 5.4 75.6 A − CCC BB BB BB
18 2018 Off 7 Dom Urban Lend 5.9 68.5 BB − B BB BB BBB
19 2018 Hot 50 Over Urban Lend 6.0 68 − BB B A BB BB
20 2018 Res 15 Dom Rural Lend 11.8 53.7 − BB BB BBB BB BB
21 2018 Res 15 Dom Rural Lend 11.5 50.2 − BB BB BB BB BB
22 2018 Res 5 Dom Rural Lend 5.6 53.9 − BB BB BB BB BB
23 2018 Off 118 Over Urban Equity 8.0 100 − BBB C BBB BB BB
24 2018 Off 50 Dom Urban Equity 10.0 100 − B C BBB B BB
25 2018 Res 5 Dom Urban Lend 11.0 63.5 − BB B BB BB BBB
26 2018 Inf 94 Over Rural Equity 6.0 100 AA − C BBB BBB BBB
27 2018 Res 3 Dom Urban Lend 4.1 26.8 − BB BB BB BB BBB
28 2018 Inf 150 Over Rural Equity 5.0 100 AA − C BB BB BB
29 2018 Hot 35 Dom Urban Lend 5.5 67 BB − B BB BB BBB
30 2018 Ind 24 Dom Rural Lend 9.2 66.9 − A B A BBB BBB
31 2018 Off 20 Dom Urban Lend 11.5 50.4 − BB BB BBB BB BBB
32 2018 Inf 183 Over Rural Lend 5.0 85 A − CCC BB BB BB
33 2018 Res 24 Dom Rural Lend 10.8 71.4 − C B BB CCC CCC
34 2018 Ind 26 Over Urban Equity 8.0 100 − BB C BBB B BB
35 2018 Res 10 Dom Rural Equity 10.0 78 − CC CCC BBB CCC CCC
36 2018 Ind 9 Dom Rural Lend 7.5 50 − BBB BB BBB BBB BBB
37 2018 Ret 20 Dom Rural Lend 5.6 48.3 − BB BB BBB BB BB
Note: Res: Residential. Off: Office, Ind: Industrial, Ret: Retail, Hot: Hotel, Inf: Infra, Dom: Domestic, Over: Overseas Operator (Oper.). Constructor (Const.).
and the UK is the same at AA; hence, there is no change. 
A rating of BBB is finally derived.
Case #32 is to provide acquisition financing to a UK 
energy company. The target asset is a renewable energy 
power plant located in a rural area in Spain, and it has 
been in operation since early 2000. The principal revenue 
source is a government subsidy that compensates for capi-
tal and operation costs. Therefore, it is critical to assess the 
risks of public policy consistency and offtaker payment ca-
pacity. Spain’s sovereign rating of A, is regarded as a grade 
of offtaker. The buyer’s credit rating of BB is assigned to 
the operation grade, as the buyer will directly operate the 
asset. The elevated LTV rating of CCC is caused by a high 
LTV ratio of 85%. The initial rating is determined BB. In 
the adjustment step, no further calibration is required. Fi-
nally, a rating of BB is confirmed.
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Case #33 is to provide mezzanine financing to a green-
field project of building private condominiums. The loca-
tion is Jeju island, Korea, located 600 km from Seoul. The 
profit rate is outstanding, 10.8%, but the deal was rejected 
by the investment board due to uncontrollable risks in 
market demand. Demand for this project should be pro-
jected based on local market performance. Since 2015, 
the housing market in Jeju has been strong, and housing 
supply has skyrocketed. Due to this oversupply, the oc-
cupancy rate in the region has dropped since 2018. Thus, 
the risk assessment team assigned a C grade to the market 
demand. The low market demand causes a low rating of 
CCC in the initial step. In the adjustment step, the rating 
is not changed due to the domestic project and rural loca-
tion. Finally, CCC is confirmed.
Four analyses are compared in order to examine the 
practicality of the proposed model (Figure 4). High finan-
cial leverage weakens cash liquidity and impairs principal 
recovery at default. In other words, high leverage in gen-
eral requires a high-risk premium, upsizing an expected 
profit rate. However, Figure 4a does not show a correlation 
between LTV and profit rate. The rationale is that other 
criteria can compensate for the drawback. In case #20, the 
LTV of 85% results in a rating of CCC, but the ratings of 
the offtaker and operator, which are higher than the LTV, 
lead to the initial rating of BB. Such findings lead to the 
conclusion that LTV is not a standalone risk criterion.
Second, the relationship between investment amount 
and profit rate is reviewed (Figure 4b). This variable (R2: 






























































































































c) Preliminary rating vs Profit rate d) Final rating vs Profit rate
Figure 4. Data analysis
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investment amount leads to a smaller expected return 
rate. This finding is agreeable due to the empirical knowl-
edge that financial institutions become more risk averse 
in proportion to the size of financing. However, the scale 
of investment cannot be objectively segmented to use as a 
risk indicator. Also, investment size can easily be resized 
without changes to deal configuration.
Third, the result of the initial rating, which is deter-
mined by the combined assessments of demand, operator, 
and LTV, is analysed (Figure 4c). In comparison to the 
cases mentioned above, this more clearly demonstrates the 
premise of high risk and high return. On the BB grade, a 
cluster can be observed, weakening the practicality of the 
proposed model. This finding strengthens the necessity of 
including more risk assessment criteria.
Forth, the outcome of the proposed model, with loca-
tion and sovereign rating variables added to the previous 
model, shows more distinct relationships between risk and 
return (Figure 4d). A tendency of risk-return profile is ob-
served. Specifically, the trend of the minimum profit level 
is more obvious than that of the maximum. This finding 
justifies the practicality of the proposed model. Standard 
& Poor’s (2018) states that in terms of both infrastructure 
project finance and corporate infrastructure, the BBB rat-
ing is achieved in most cases (42%), a finding sustained 
since 2000. In terms of real estate, Standard & Poor’s 
(2016) reports that the median rating is BBB-. Such de-
rived risk-return borderline provides an insight in regards 
to setting an admissible threshold. 
4. Discussion
Determining the level of risk appetite for real asset prod-
ucts is challenging for financial institutions. This is in con-
trast to conventional products such as stocks and bonds, 
in which market price and risk premiums can be objec-
tively identified. The idiosyncratic features of each trans-
action in the real asset market require decision makers to 
define acceptable risk thresholds based on their empirical 
experiences, or in other words, their subjectivity. The pro-
posed model aims to develop a fast screening rating sys-
tem. However, although the rating outcome generated by 
the model is agreeable, it may encounter several counter 
arguments in terms of its practicality.
First, insufficient data potentially lead to the study’s 
outcome deviating from practice. Its result shows that a 
rating is ideally correlated with its profit rate, illustrating a 
tendency for high risk and high return. However, the data 
used in this study have 37 cases, and the period is three 
years from 2016 to 2018. Due to the lack of data, this study 
analyzes rating results regardless of their types. If ratings 
are compared in the same group, the practicality can be 
better justified. In addition, the study uses data of three 
years period. An expected return is determined by adding 
a risk premium, which is inherited from the asset’s unique-
ness, to a benchmark interest rate with the same maturity, 
which is determined in the market. As a quantitative de-
scription of a rating is a risk premium, comparing ratings 
and risk premiums (profit rate – benchmark interest rate) 
in more than 10 years’ records can strengthen the model.
Second, the rating results cannot fully avoid subjectiv-
ity issues. The main input sources of this rating platform 
in regards to offtaker and operator and constructor are 
credit ratings confirmed by a global credit rating agency. 
This third-party rating is in general regarded as trustwor-
thy, but occasionally fails to accurately describe the object’s 
status. AAA grade companies, such as Lehman Brothers, 
AIG, etc., were dismantled during the financial crisis. The 
main cause of such failures is subjectivity in decision mak-
ing. Unfortunately, no alternative has yet been developed in 
order to replace the credit rating system. Outside periods of 
economic turmoil, rating information is regarded as reliable 
in the financial market. In addition, it is hard for financial 
institutions to collect and analyze large amounts of data and 
assign a grade. These circumstances justify this model’s ap-
proach of using rating information as a main source.
Third, the result can be misguided by the instant and 
incomprehensive rating system utilized in this study. Glob-
al rating agencies deliver a rating by employing a full-scale 
review system in which experienced raters and sophisti-
cated systems assess all dimensional risks, from underly-
ing asset performance to macro environment status. The 
criticality in determining rating quality is inherited from 
the consistency and accuracy of the rating conductor’s 
responses and the standardized rating scale and system. 
These rating agencies have invested huge capital to meet 
such challenges. However, financial institutions that seek 
to punctually assess the risks of real assets cannot employ 
a complex system due to budget and time constraints. As 
an alternative, the proposed model, which analyzes key 
aspects of a deal structure without requiring trained per-
sonnel and extensive time, may correspond to the banker’s 
need. The feature of the core risks being extracted from 
BIS’s regulations and assessments executed by third-party 
sources, excluding subjective decisions, strengthens the 
reliability of the model.
Conclusions
Capital flow to alternative investment has expanded since 
the 2008 financial crisis to avoid the return volatility usu-
ally observed in the traditional market and to secure port-
folio diversity. Real asset investments, such as real estate 
and infrastructure, are core groups of alternative invest-
ment. Their key advantage is to secure stability in project 
returns during the holding. However, challenges caused by 
a lack of liquidity and great information asymmetry raise 
the bar for participation. Heterogeneous features of each 
transaction᾽s profile also make it ineffective to introduce 
a benchmark return index, which also hinders investors᾽ 
access to this market.
The newly developed rating method suggested by this 
study has been invented to address such issues. Simply 
designed but utilizing core risk criteria, it contributes to 
reducing information asymmetry and building invest-
ment benchmarks. Like other conventional and theoretical 
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models, this assesses various risk dimensions under a con-
cretely standardized architecture and results in a rating 
that can be interpreted to a grade delivered by a commer-
cial agency. Such comparability is assured by the back-
ground of the proposed system that is developed in inher-
iting the scheme of Moody’s.
However, the shortcoming aroused by the simplifica-
tion can overwhelm the proposed model’s positive features. 
The exclusion increases the chance of overlooking critical 
features that the current qualitative and in-depth analysis 
models identify. Future research will overcome such issues 
by employing more varied sources and techniques.
References
Allison, R., & Tufts, S. (2015). Infrastructure investments: an at-
tractive option to help deliver a prosperous and sustainable 
economy. Retrieved from https://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/EY-infrastructure-investments/$FILE/EY-infra-
structure-investments.pdf
Bae, D. S., & Damnjanovic, I. (2018). Credit risk assessment and 
monitoring of TIF bonds. The Journal of Structured Finance, 
23(4), 57-68. https://doi.org/10.3905/jsf.2018.2018.1.062
Bank for International Settlements. (2001). Working paper on the 
internal ratings-based approach to specialised lending expo-
sures. Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp9.pdf
Bank for International Settlements. (2017). High-level summary 
of Basel III reforms. Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf
Bank of England. (2019). Internal Ratings Based (IRB) ap-
proaches. Retrieved from https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
prudential-regulation/publication/2013/internal-ratings-
based-approaches-ss
Barkham, R., & Luo, W. (2018). Global investment volume rises, 
driven by robust U.S. market. Retrieved from https://www.
cbre.com/research-and-reports/global-marketflash-global-
investment-volume-rises
Bonsall, S., Koharki, K., & Neamitu, M. (2015). The effectiveness 
of credit rating agency monitoring: evidence from asset secu-
ritization. The Accounting Review, 90(5), 1779-1810. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51028
Bonsall,  S.  B., Koharki, K., & Neamtiu, M. (2017). When do 
differences in credit rating methodologies matter? Evidence 
from high information uncertainty borrowers. The Account-
ing Review, 92(4), 53-79. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51641
CBRE. (2017). The global market leader in commercial real estate 
services. Retrieved from http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.
File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9Njc5MzI4fENoaWxkSUQ9Mzg
4NDM4fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
Choi, S. C. (2018). Expedited infrastructure investment by as-
set management company. Business Post Korea. Retrieved 
from http://www.businesspost.co.kr/BP?command=article_
view&num=88116
Fracassi, C., Petry, S., & Tate, G. (2013). Are credit ratings sub-
jective? The role of credit analysts in determining ratings. Re-
trieved from https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2014/re-
trieve.php?pdfid=551
Garmaise, M. J., & Moskowitz, T.  J. (2003). Confronting infor-
mation asymmetries: evidence from real estate markets. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 17(2), 405-437. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg037
Griffin, J. M., & Tang, D. Y. (2012). Did subjectivity play a role in 
CDO credit ratings? The Journal of Finance, 67(4), 1293-1328. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01748.x
He, Y., Wang, J., & Wei, K. C. J. (2011). Do bond rating changes 
affect the information asymmetry of stock trading? Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 18(1), 103-116. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2010.06.001
Heitmann, K., & Davison, A. (2018). Moody᾽s: default and recov-
ery rates for project finance bank loans remain stable. Retrieved 
from https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Default-and-
recovery-rates-for-project-finance-bank-loans--PR_380331
Heitmann, K., Hawken, N., & Davison, A. (2017). Default and 




Hull,  J. C., Predescu, M., & White, A. (2005). Bond prices, de-
fault probabilities and risk premiums. SSRN. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2173148
Korean Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport. (2016). 







KPMG. (2019). Emerging trends in infrastructure 2019. Retrieved 
from https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/industries/infrastruc-
ture.html
Longstaff, F. A., Mithal, S., & Eric, N. (2005). Corporate Yield 
spreads: default risk or liquidity? New evidnece from the 
credit default swap market. The Journal of Finance, 60(5), 
2213-2253. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00797.x
M&G Institutional. (2017). The opportunity in European com-









Medina, J. (2018). Moody᾽s update its methodology for rating 
generic project finance issuers. Retrieved from https://www.
moodys.com/research/Moodys-updates-its-methodology-for-
rating-generic-project-finance-issuers--PR_382107
Medina, J., & Marty, D. (2018). Rating methodology: generic 
project finance. Retrieved from https://www.moodys.com/re-
searchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1091596
Meers, W., & Humphrey, T. (2017). Macquarie infrastructure 
debt investment solutions: an introduction to infrastructure 
debt. Retrieved from https://www.macquarie.com/dafiles/
Internet/mgl/global/shared/sf/pdf/midis-an-introduction-to-
infrastructure-debt.pdf?v=2
Morgan Stanley. (2014). Alternative investments: innovative strat-
egies for asset  allocation. Retrieved from https://www.mor-
ganstanley.com/wealth/investmentsolutions/pdfs/altscapa-
bilitiesbrochure.pdf
Morgenson, G. (2009). When bond ratings get stale. Retrieved 
from https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/business/
economy/11gret.html
50 D. S. Bae. Internal credit rating framework for real asset investment




Nikolića, D. M., Jednak, S., Benković, S., & Poznanić, V. (2011). 
Project finance risk evaluation of the Electric power industry 
of Serbia. Energy Policy, 39(10), 6168-6177. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.07.017
Peng, J., & Brucato, P. F. (2004). An empirical analysis of mar-
ket and institutional mechanisms for alleviating information 
asymmetry in the municipal bond market. Journal of Econom-
ics and Finance, 28(2), 226-238. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02761613
Piney, C. (2003). Risk identification: combining the tools to de-
liver the goods. Paper presented at the PMI® Global Congress 
2003−EMEA, The Hague, South Holland, The Netherlands.
Raz, T., Shenhar, A. J., & Dvir, D. (2002). Risk management, proj-
ect success, and technological uncertainty. R&D Management, 
32(2), 101-109. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9310.00243
Renigier-Biłozor, M., Wisniewski, R., Kaklauskas, A., & Biłozor, 
A. (2014). Rating methodology for real estate markets – Po-
land case study. International Journal of Strategic Property 
Management, 18(2), 198-212. 
https://doi.org/10.3846/1648715X.2014.927401
Ribeiro, M. I. F., & Ferreira, F. A. F. (2017). A fuzzy knowledge-
based framework for risk assessment of residential real es-
tate investments. Technological and Economic Development of 
Economy, 23(1), 140-156. 
https://doi.org/10.3846/20294913.2016.1212742
S&P Global Ratings. (2018). S&P Global Ratings definitions. 
Retrieved from https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/
web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/504352
Segismundo, A., & Miguel, P.  A.  C. (2008). Failure mode and 
effects analysis (FMEA) in the context of risk management 
in new product development: a case study in an automotive 
company. International Journal of Quality & Reliability Man-
agement, 25(9), 899-912. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/02656710810908061
Standard & Poor᾽s. (2014). Project finance ratings criteria refer-




Tang,  T.  T. (2009). Information asymmetry and firm᾽s credit 
market access: evidence from moody᾽s credit rating format 
refinement. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 325-351. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.07.007
The European Group of Valuer᾽s Associations. (2003). European 
Property and Market Rating: A Valuer᾽s Guide. Retrieved from 
https://www.tegova.org/data/bin/a56efb621c7ae1_EPMR1.pdf
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Real Estate 
Market Advisory Group. (2012). Evaluation of real estate 
property and market risk for real estate backed financial prod-
ucts. Retrieved from https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/
hlm/sessions/docs2012/real_estate_property_and_market_
risk.pdf
Yescombe,  E.  R. (2002). Principles of project finance. Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-012770851-5.50002-6
